Special thanks to Eric Boggs of The OHIO Podcast for joining me to discuss Ohio State’s roster on this week’s podcast:

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Offense

Ohio State is the 6^th most frequently studied team in my library, behind only Oregon State, the three other Pac-12 teams that joined the Big Ten in 2024, and Oregon itself. I have every season of Ohio State football charted since 2018 when Coach Day took over from Urban Meyer, as well as the 2014 season for Oregon’s matchup in the national title game, and several other individual games between the Buckeyes and Big Ten teams the Ducks would play from 2011 and 2017 like Wisconsin, Nebraska, and Michigan State. As such I have the Buckeyes’ complete roster and recruiting database built out for the every one of last 15 seasons, for continuity.

The peak of Ohio State’s offensive depth of talent was 2022. That’s not exactly the same thing as saying 2022 was the Buckeyes’ best offense, or that at every position they had the best player they ever would over the last decade and a half, rather that it was the most robust offense – they could play football however they wanted behind an elite offensive line, an efficient and explosive rushing attack, and well distributed elite talent throughout the skill positions that could attack any part of the field and could change pace of play at will. More so than any other Buckeyes offense I studied, opposing defenses couldn’t concentrate on any one player or type of offensive production, because it would only make the other players and forms of production stronger.

Each year since then starting in 2023, as I’ve documented in my preview series (2024, 2025, 2026) and have been discussing in a running conversation with my friend Eric in our podcast interviews, Ohio State’s offense has grown less and less robust. The clearest issue to film reviewers is a decay in effectiveness throughout the offensive line unit after the retirement of OL coach Greg Studrawa due to back ailments after the 2021 season – as his excellent players have been filtering out of the program, they have not been followed up with linemen of equivalent or even Power-conference replacement quality. Tight end blocking has been highly problematic and it appears Coach Day has protected an underperforming and transfer-hungry TE coach. The last high quality tight end left for the NFL after 2023, and most troublingly a highly rated transfer out has done much better at his new school this year.

Running backs and wide receivers held out longer, but the same pattern of attrition obtains in these rooms as well. Both of the national championship-winning backs departed after the 2024 season, and the new RB coach’s choices for replacements were spectacular failures, only discovering late in the 2025 season a competent true freshman who has ever since carried an outsized share of the load with attendant fatigue and lingering injury problems. Wideouts have been the saving grace of the offense, with multiple elite receivers on the team at once, but one-by-one they’ve been drafted highly and when the WR coach who brought them in took a head coaching job at the end of last year, the Buckeyes were left with only a single generational talent through whom an extraordinary and unprecedented amount of the offense has gone in 2026.

This process of concentrating the offense through attrition into a single form of attack — from what was only a few years ago a highly robust one — has not been widely discussed in the national media, for reasons that are beyond the scope of this article to speculate upon. To those paying attention, as Eric has been, the brittleness of Ohio State’s offense and its vulnerability to snapping as it did last Saturday against a defense ranked 86^th at the time in F+ advanced statistics, was unsurprising.

The singular weapon that had kept the Buckeyes’ offense propped up was explosive passing to junior #4 WR Je. Smith, a generational talent with perhaps the greatest catch radius and strongest route-running skills I’ve ever seen at his age. Targets to Smith make up 17.7% of all of Ohio State’s meaningful plays prior to garbage time but nearly 36% of their total yardage, better than a 2x value. Smith’s 15 top receptions alone, just 3.5% of Ohio State’s plays, make up 21.5% of their yards, an astonishing 6.15x value. These events were absolutely game-breaking and cured all ills: poor protection, inaccurate throws, passes into coverage. No one else could make these plays, they just required a QB willing and able to put the ball in his vicinity. They would happen two or three times a week … up until last Saturday:

Sadly, when taking a sack midway through the 4^th quarter against Indiana in week 7, the starter for the last two years #10 QB Sayin injured his throwing arm. Eric told me that he’s unlikely to play for the rest of the regular season, though Eric said on our podcast that he believes Sayin will come back to Ohio State to finish his degree in 2027 and there’s a chance Sayin could return if the Buckeyes make a late playoff push this season. In something of a surprise, the backup who took over to finish the Indiana game was not the 5-star sophomore #9 QB St. Clair, but rather the high 3-star true freshman #13 QB Fahey. The team had a bye in week 8, then played USC in the Coliseum in week 9, with Fahey playing the entire game.

From what Eric told me about the difference in preparation effort between Fahey and St. Clair, and what I observed from Fahey’s play (I haven’t seen St. Clair at all except in a trivial amount of garbage time), I think Eric is absolutely right that Fahey will finish the season. I’m very impressed with Fahey’s grasp of the offense, decision-making, athleticism, and maturity. I think the circumstances Fahey was put in were very challenging and the weight of expectations as well as the defensive onslaught — knowing that getting to him was the quickest way to secure the win — would have crushed most people twice his age, but I didn’t see him flinch at all, quite the opposite.

But in watching tape, Fahey simply doesn’t have Sayin’s arm talent, and on the majority (68.4%) of his dropbacks leaves the pocket and cuts the field in half, diminishing his options and usually being locked onto a single target. There is a stark reduction in every measure of offensive performance with Fahey in. Most significantly, Fahey was unable to hit WR Smith for any of those game-breaking plays, or alternate wideouts even when they were wide open deep down the field:

The running backs in the rushing game suffered as well, as defenses could devote 2^nd & 3^rd level resources that they had been backing out, and because OC Arthur Smith leaned even more into the unproductive run game instead of punishing them for it, this created a virtuous circle. Here are the splits on a rate basis, controlling for garbage time and field position:

With Fahey in, it’s my analysis that if OC Smith re-balances the offense and takes a fresh look at which routes and targets are actually productive for his young QB, there are some opportunities for growth in the passing offense — I’m less sanguine about the rushing offense, though maybe — some of which seemed to surprise Eric on the podcast because he felt skeptical that such a reconsideration would happen. Nonetheless, it’s my job to lay out what those options would look like if they came to be, so let’s examine the skill talent groups.

Tight Ends

Eric and I have both been very critical of this unit and its development for many years. In regards to blocking, nothing has changed – each receives grades under 60% effectiveness on my tally sheet, and taking #86 TE M. Williams and #84 TE Welcing as transfers was very puzzling given their prior play in this regard. Welcing isn’t really playing, #85 TE Christian has continued to be a non-factor even when he is on the field, and #88 TE LeBlanc is hurt.

Analytically, OC Smith’s deployment of Williams and #83 TE Roberts up until this point has been inappropriate – differential modeling shows they contribute no upside to rush performance except in short yardage when they should be passing the ball anyway, they’re substantial holding and late hit penalty risks, and 12-personnel sets remove far more productive wideouts from the field.

Or rather, they had done so until the QB change. At this point, the top two TEs are poised for the greatest growth in production on the team, as they do have good hands and defenses have yet to hone in on them. Roberts and Williams cumulatively on 23 targets — including Fahey, with no real dropoff — have a 72% per-target success rate given the down & distance for about 11 adjusted YPT. I think that would come down somewhat if there were a substantial shift to throwing to them more often, as I think much of it has to do with defenses leaving underneath throws open while backing out to cover deep WR routes that Fahey may be incapable of hitting, but at least in the short term the opportunity is ripe.

Wide Receivers

Smith’s numbers are absolutely incredible, even with a majority of targets he’s maintaining a 65.8% success rate and 11.96 adjusted YPT, which shouldn’t be possible (defenses should lock out any receiver to whom they’re so certain the play is going, my predictive algorithm suggests his numbers should suffer by eight percentage points and over four yards per target for that much overconcentration, but defenses have been without success).

The next most targeted receiver is UTSA transfer #3 WR McCuin, who has a third of Smith’s targets, at four percentage points less efficiency and three and a half fewer YPT. I can’t think of any better commentary on the state of development and disruption to the WR corps at the departure of former WR coach Brian Hartline at the end of last season.

I’ll reserve comment on #0 WR Inniss, the slot receiver who unfortunately seems to have taken an injury, and will be unavailable on Saturday, other than to say that longtime readers will understand why there’s an opportunity for Fahey’s former high school teammate #7 WR Bell, who’s been averaging 8.7 YPT but on only 10 meaningful targets this season, to step up and provide reliable slot production.

Eric and I have both been completely stumped by the lack of playing time for freshman 5-star #15 WR C. Henry, an enormous and obviously talented wideout who’s averaging 14.6 YPT and a 55.6% success rate, but only 9 meaningful targets all year. During the offseason we both figured him for the other X-receiver starter opposite the Z-receiver Smith, or maybe a Y-receiver displacing Inniss from the slot. Instead it’s been McCuin, Inniss, and 12-personnel sets that OC Smith favors. Henry also looks like an opportunity for growth, since Henry’s size and skillset looks more accessible to Fahey.

With Fahey under center, here’s a representative sample of successful passing plays:

And unsuccessful passing plays:

Running Backs

To date, OC Smith has called a perfect run-pass balance on meaningful 1st downs: 90 rushes, 90 passes. That’s wildly inappropriate given how ineffective Ohio State’s run game has been for the last two seasons and puts them constantly behind the chains, expecially considering the differential: they have a 62.2% success rate on those 90 passes, but only a 41.8% success rate on those 90 rushes, more than 20 points worth of difference.

It’s an inefficient run team overall, driven by how frequently and poorly they run on 1st down, and also rushing 34 (out of 80) times on 2nd & long at a 44.12% success rate. Worse, despite having the most undefendable receiver in the country, and a 78% rush efficiency rate on 3^rd & short, Smith has called passing plays on only 9% of 2^nd & short “money down” opportunities, instead robotically rushing to convert those 2^nd & shorts 83% of the time in order to go on incredibly long drives. Ohio State has more 10+ play drives through only eight games in 2026 than in any 12-game season I’ve charted them in the last decade and a half.

What splits and ALY numbers like that almost always indicate — and it’s what I’m seeing on film — is that the backs are pretty tough to bring down, and the problem is the offensive line. So I think the backs’ per-carry numbers are artificially suppressed, but we can infer who can be their own blocker from their differential figures.

Confusingly, there are two running backs named Jackson. Last year’s true freshman hero was #25 RB Bo Jackson, and after chasing both of the 2025 duds out of the room, he’s now totally overworked with a 9% increase in carry share and a falloff to 47.7% success rate and 4.6 adjusted YPC, down from 5.3 YPC last year. That’s been worsened by what Eric told me is season-ending surgery for Florida transfer #24 RB J. Jackson, who had been outperforming the starter on a per-carry basis at a 55.9% success rate and 5.2 YPC, I think for less fatigue since he had a third the touches.

The most intriguing back is the sophomore #32 RB West. His numbers in 2026 are even more boom-or-bust as they were in 2025 – an even lower success rate this season at 38.7% (which is just atrocious) but with an above average YPC at 5.0 (it was 5.5 last year), indicating a whole lot of nothing and then a big run. That’s been exactly the pattern in both years, with the interesting thing being that seven of West’s ten biggest runs have come in the last two games against Indiana and USC. That could indicate West has turned a corner toward consistent big production … or it could just be same momentary hot phase and the longer cold phase will reassert itself as before.

Here’s a representative sample of successful rushing plays throughout the season:

And unsuccessful rushes:

Offensive Line

The problems at offensive line are not limited to a single player, or instability, or momentary absences, or coaching turmoil, or transfers. They are systemic and technical, related to the disastrous three-year tenure of Justin Frye at OL coach from 2022-24 after similarly destroying the UCLA offensive line (he left for the Arizona Cardinals in 2025 and has had predictable effects on their offense). The current group of linemen are, more or less, all Frye products and current OL coach Bowen hasn’t been able to do much about their waist-bending and inability to properly track assignments, though it’s difficult to determine how much blame to assign Bowen; I suspect the situation won’t change until the group is turned over.

#75 C Hinzman has been a reliable snapper this season but is also the main reason the team can’t execute its inside run game. #51 LG Montgomery tends to give up a lot of ground in pass protection, getting pushed into the pocket, but not letting the defender throw him aside. Sayin got used to it a few weeks into 2025, but it’s been causing Fahey to break the pocket.

The right side of the line has been the biggest problem up through this week, as the Buckeyes have not been able to tell which right tackle is least problematic of the three they’ve played at the position out of the rotation somehow landed on the one with the lowest grades who gets blown up on virtually every play, #70 RT Daniels. I think a slightly more tolerable option would have been #67 OL Siereveld, but there’s a good chance Siereveld will be needed at left tackle since the starter there, #69 LT Moore, is listed as questionable in this week’s availability report. (I also might have pulled the appallingly poor #58 RG Vansickle for his backup and jumbo package player #78 OL Cook.)

Beyond my well wishes for Moore’s health, running out the math on my tally sheet, it doesn’t appear to matter much if he’s able to play or not. If he is, it means they can continue rotating Siereveld and Daniels at RT. If not, then it’s full-time Siereveld at LT, full-time Daniels at RT. Moore is ineffective enough that it’s six of one, half a dozen of the other.

This can be most readily observed through negative play frequency, which in absolute terms (rate basis is thrown by the absurdly long drives OC Smith is taking them on driving the play count, and thus denominator, up by 26% over nominal) is the second highest in the Big Ten. Prior to garbage time they have given up 15 sacks and 18 TFLs with six turnovers, and the penalty distribution is near-perfectly even across the six main linemen adjusted for their snap counts, 20 total with 13 being procedurals and 7 being holding flags … in the Big Ten.

Defense

I was very surprised to see the structural shift in the defense that DC Patricia implemented over the course of the season, taking a squad that had been a 4-down front for as long as I can remember and increasingly operating a 3-down front over the course of the season, to the point where I think this is best described as a 3-3-5 in their most recent games.

It most closely resembles a Tite front with three big DTs — a head-up nose over or shaded just off the center and two more lined up inside the tackles usually as 4is — and it evolved from having a couple of ends lined up on the same side of the formation, to a STUD on-ball, and now most commonly has a single former DE as a slightly off-ball OLB and another backer opposite him also slightly off-ball to form a double-eagle, plus a MIKE over the QB and the strong safety just behind him in the box. They play man coverage on the back end and the key to all of it is tight coverage from the nickel, who midseason was converted to more like an inside corner, but then got hurt and the defense lost its resiliency. (If longtime readers are reminded of Ryan Walters’ high-stress defensive scheme, that’s not a coincidence.)

Eric and I had a lengthy discussion on the podcast as to why this defensive scheme change happened. He thinks it’s because of a loss of effectiveness in the linebacker corps, when they lost their starters and a key backup from their defining 4-2-5 system and the replacements couldn’t be trusted as the fulcrum of that defense. I think it had more to do with weakness in the defensive end unit – since that’s the group which isn’t producing havoc stats and disappeared from the field, whereas the linebackers have continued to play and have been … fine.

That is, I think Eric is right to bemoan the linebackers because in a 3-down front LBs are supposed to be generating the havoc stats and they’re not, so ultimately this switch isn’t accomplishing anything, but Patricia wouldn’t have made the switch if the DEs were four-deep with havoc-generators. But then, I haven’t been able to actually see the DEs, because some have been hurt and at least one is in the doghouse, so it’s tough to make a definitive assessment, or rule out guys returning and snapping back to an effective 4-2-5.7

What’s been apparent from charting is that they’ve picked up their own version of some of the Mint defensive philosophy that goes along with this defensive structure. What they’re really trying to do is minimize explosive plays, because that’s the highest correlation to scoring drives. They play strong efficiency defense on 1^st down — 56% against the run and 61% against the pass — and they’re great against the pass on 3^rd & medium, 62.5%, rising to an elite 79% on 3^rd & long (though that last category is weird … unlike many teams with such a number, I can’t actually see the Buckeyes doing anything different, there’s no more energetic pass rush and the coverage isn’t any better, it’s more like the QBs they play just panic themselves).

Meanwhile, the defense gives the offense lots of reasons — or bait — to go on long drives if they make it past 1^st down, with a poor rush defense success rate on 2^nd & short and 2^nd & long (except Indiana for some reason, non-IU teams were successful 10 of 13 times at 7.5 YPC, IU was 3 of 8 for 2.75 YPC). OSU is also a terrible 3^rd & short defense: regardless of run or pass, OSU surrendered 6.46 YPP on 3^rd & short … Texas in particular hammered them with 6 of 7 rush conversions at 5.7 YPC, and during conference play they’re surrendering 7 of 10 rush conversions on 3^rd & short at 3.6 YPC.

Strategically, that means offenses should avoid taking the bait. They ought to aim for explosive plays, try to set themselves up in 2^nd & short, and despite OSU rolling out the red carpet for converting in that situation, instead take a shot. Since OSU is poor at defending a follow-up 3^rd & short conversion if the offense misses, 2^nd & short is like playing with free money. The crucial thing is to stay ahead of the chains, because the one elite area of the defense is 3^rd & long … unless it’s not and that’s an illusion, and I sort of think it is because the pass rush and coverage strike me as somewhat suspect, but even so, it’s never wise to be cavalier about 3^rd & long.

Defensive Linemen

Eric and I agreed this was the deepest unit of the defense, and if we couldn’t settle on what the “pull” was as to the scheme change, we certainly both felt the reliable depth of this group was the “push”. That is, because they had five experienced, playable 300+ lbs upperclassmen, they could easily go from a four-man rotation (two starters, two backups, plus a spare) for the pair of interior line spots in an even surface, to a five-man rotation (three starters, two backups) in the odd surface without a hiccup.

I had figured that apparent freak injury at the very end of last week’s game against USC to their lead lineman, #96 DL Houston, would be handled in stride then, since in a 3-down front unlike a 4-down front, the big guys are space-eaters not penetrators, so as long as the replacement is big enough — and they all appear to be — then they’re interchangeable. But Houston doesn’t appear at all on this week’s injury report, so this seems to be academic.

The player I’ve seen most at nose has been #55 DL Walker; because of his height he’s a bit squatter and he tends not to penetrate. If they do return to a 4-2-5 or a 4-3, I think Walker is most likely to see a playing time reduction, with the rotation more like Houston and #94 DT Moore as the 1^st line with #3 DL Ja. Smith and #53 DL W. Smith in the 2^nd line.

Edges

This unit is difficult to assess, as all I’ve really seen of it is #2 DE K. Jackson over the last two years. He’s played very well but the scheme change now frequently has him dropping out into coverage, and his backfield attack is replaced by … well literally anyone else, who definitionally has a far lower havoc stat per rep share. The backup has been Alabama transfer #4 DE Russaw, who has a good motor but lacks the length to lever up tackles and flex around into the backfield.

In the three non-con games at the beginning of the season, we saw six defensive ends in what I thought was the expected 4-down front. #12 DE Atkinson who previously transferred in from North Carolina but got stuck behind Jackson and Caden Curry last year, looked set to get a fulltime role this year, but he seems to be even more defeated this year as there’s no NFL player ahead of him and the position is just eliminated rather than giving it to him, and when he does see the field … as Eric put it he “leads the league in personal fouls” which Coach Day despises, then finally getting another chance and committing another one right away. #9 DE Grady is my favorite of this group for his speed and reach, but he’s battled injuries this year and his lack of playing time is starting to be a problem. I know very little about the true freshman #34 DE Wilder as he’s been out of action the last four games. #44 DE Sitanilei has continued to get a sliver of play each week but Eric told me the coaches have made vague statements about needing to earn trust for more playing time, which could mean anything from better edge containment to being on the run from Interpol for art forgery.

This is all to say – those four guys were each phased out and then disappeared, so that over the last four games Jackson and Russaw have gotten three-quarters of the reps between them, and the other four guys have had to split the the remaining quarter. On the podcast, we talked out some possibilities for these vanishing ends to get healthy, or working themselves back into good graces, or an injury to a tackle forcing their hand, or DC Patricia just re-evaluating, any of which could result in a return to the previous 4-2-5 structure.

Linebackers

Even though we’d come to different conclusions about what the changeover in the linebacker corps meant to the rest of the defense, Eric and I agreed about what the changes actually are. As has been typical for Ohio State, they gave virtually no developmental play even in garbage time to the backups, so only #26 LB Pierce, who was part of the 2025 rotation, had any experience, while #5 LB Pettijohn, #17 LB Alford, and #23 LB Stover were completely green. They added a true freshman, #20 LB C. Johnson, and a Wisconsin transfer who in my opinion had constantly underperformed and got benched in favor of better players as part of the Badgers’ transformation last season.

Pierce has been solid but unspectacular in the middle of the defense, Pettijohn has shown flashes of raw talent but not the technical refinement needed to play the position well, Alford, Johnson, and Stover disappeared down the depth chart, and Alliegro took over as an experienced backer whose size became valuable as a quasi-OLB closer to the line of scrimmage.

In my opinion this is a self-fulfilling prophecy – young talented backers like Pettijohn and Johnson don’t have the technique to play because the staff won’t give them the playing time to develop it. Expecting them to have no growing pains is ahistorical; 1^st round picks Arvell Reese and Sonny Styles were far from perfect when they first took the field, the difference was they didn’t have a 3-star transfer taking their developmental reps away from them.

The structure of the defense gums up the middle of field by concentrating big bodies and the strong safety right over it. There is a massive disparity on inside vs outside runs, because the defense leaves the edges lightly defended and the backers aren’t getting there fast enough.

Here’s a representative sample of successfully defended rushing plays:

And unsuccessfully defended rushes:

Secondary

As has been expected for some time, #6 CB Sanchez took over as starting corner, though it’s been to somewhat mixed results in the first part of the season. Evaluation got more complicated when the scheme changed and the nickel’s responsibilities’ changed, then the nickel, freshman #25 DB Timmons, was injured and missed three of the last four games. One solution to that was moving the other starting corner, #7 CB Mathews, inside to play nickel, but the backup, transfer #18 CB Calhoun, proved completely ineffective. Calhoun didn’t play at all last week, instead they only lightly rotated the other transfer, #14 CB Kelly, and safety backup #28 DB Caldwell played nickel instead.

Caldwell, a true freshman, had previously come in to replace safety #1 DB Little, yet another transfer, when Little was dinged up a bit in the middle of the year. Little was brought in to play the strong safety role that #8 DB McClain vacated to take over the free safety position that Caleb Downs left when he was drafted. In 2025 McClain graded out very well on my tally sheet in that strong safety role, Little has been a bit of a step down but he’s basically solid, but I had’t gotten to see McClain seriously tested in the different free safety role until last week against USC … when multiple giant plays went right past or over him.

Timmons does not appear on this week’s injury report and Eric told me he’s expected to be back this Saturday. I’ve been pretty impressed with what I’ve been able to see from the true freshman though unfortunately it hasn’t been a very large sample. I think the biggest advantage that his return would bring is the defense not having to shuffle pieces around or play other true freshmen to deal with his absence; as Eric and I discussed over the Summer it was puzzling how light on depth and dependent on transfers the secondary was given the longevity of the staff; the three transfers and two freshmen mentioned have played over four returning DBs while six others transferred out prior to the season.

Unfortunately, OSU’s opponents have been analytically inept and have not provided an adequate sample on 2^nd & short passing (Indiana just bypassed 2^nd & short, Texas did nothing but run, only Iowa passed more than once and they were quick throws). The tape that does exist does not indicate a strong pattern for situational strengths and weaknesses to explosive passing, instead it simply suggests going at the secondary at the beginning of the series when all options are open and path dependencies are salutary. The best I can find to the 3^rd & long effect is having extra defenders in coverage and making the QB think about the pass longer.

Here’s a representative sample of successfully defended passing plays:

And unsuccessfully defended passes: